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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, we study the retailer’s ordering behavior in a manufacturer-retailer supply 
chain where the retailer faces the newsvendor problem. Analytical literature predicts 
that the retailer will use the critical ratio solution when determining her order quantity 
from the manufacturer. When real human beings play the roles of manufacturer and 
retailer in controlled experiments, however, the retailer decisions are observed to 
deviate from these theoretical predictions. The deviations are due to (1) individual 
biases and heuristics, (2) the strategic interaction between the two players. Literature 
has studied the effects of individual biases and heuristics using simple newsvendor 
experiments. However, very few researchers have conducted experiments where both 
sides are human. This extension is valuable because supply chain relations in practice 
depend on human-to-human interaction between managers.  In this study, using data 
from the supply chain experiments of Şahin and Kaya (2011), we aim to answer the 
following questions: (1) Do retailer subjects follow the heuristics observed in simple 
newsvendor experiments? (2) What are the factors affecting retailer decisions? (3) Do 
retailer subjects learn to make better decisions over time?  We find that retailer behavior 
is highly heterogeneous. While there is support for the use of decision heuristics at the 
aggregate level, we have mixed results at individual level. Likewise, the factors that 
affect retailer order quantity are found to be subject-dependent. The extent of learning is 
also found to differ from subject to subject.  
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Özet 
 
Bu tezde, perakendecinin “gazeteci çocuk” problemi ile karşı karşıya kaldığı bir üretici-
perakendeci tedarik zincirinde, perakendecinin sipariş davranışını ele aldık. Analitik 
literatür, perakendecinin üreticiden sipariş edeceği miktarı belirlerken kritik oran 
çözümünü kullanacağını öngörür. Kontrollü deneylerde gerçek insanlar üretici ve 
perakendeci rolü aldıklarında ise perakendecinin sipariş miktarı kararlarının teorik 
tahminlerden saptığı görülmüştür. Bu sapmalar (1) bireysel önyargılar ve sezgisellerden, 
(2) iki oyuncu arasındaki stratejik etkileşimden kaynaklanmaktadır. Literatür, basit 
gazeteci çocuk deneyleri kullanarak bireysel önyargıların ve sezgisellerin etkilerini ele 
almıştır. Ancak, çok az araştırmacı her iki tarafın da insan olduğu deneyler 
gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu tezde, Şahin ve Kaya (2011)’in tedarik zinciri deney verileri 
kullanılarak aşağıdaki soruların cevaplanması hedeflenmiştir. (1) Perakendeciler basit 
gazeteci çocuk deneylerinde gözlemlenen sezgisel yöntemleri kullanıyor mu? (2) 
Perakendeci kararlarını etkileyen faktörler nelerdir? (3) Perakendeciler zamanla daha iyi 
kararlar vermeyi öğreniyorlar mı? Ana bulgumuz, perakendeci davranışlarında 
gözlemlediğimiz heterojenliktir. Sonuçlarımız toplam düzeydeki sezgisel karar 
kullanımını desteklerken, bireysel düzeydekileri desteklememiştir. Aynı şekilde, hem 
perakendeci sipariş miktarını etkileyen faktörlerin, hem de öğrenme derecesinin kişiye 
bağlı olduğu gözlemlenmiştir.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Most products in today’s world reach end customers through supply chains that consist 
of multiple firms. Specifically, the supply chain encompasses all steps it takes to get a 
good or service from the supplier to the customer. Supply chain management is 
important for modern businesses because it synchronizes activities of partner 
businesses, achieving higher efficiency. However, at the same time, it introduces the 
need for “coordination” between the chain members.  
 
Every supply chain consists of individual firms the purpose of which is maximizing its 
own profit. Individual profit maximization causes inefficiency from the supply chain 
point of view, such as the well-known “double marginalization” problem (Spengler 
1950). In order to increase the overall profit of the supply chain, the members of a 
supply chain must improve their coordination with each other. Supply chain 
coordination can be improved by using proper contracts between supply chain 
members. For this reason, the study of contracts between supply chain members has 
attracted great attention in business as well as in academic literature. 
 
The issue of supply chain coordination has been studied by many academics (See, for 
example Cachon 2003, and Kaya and Ozer 2010). The focus of these studies is the 
characterization of contract terms that determine how the profit and risk will be shared 
between the firms. Well-organized contracts can coordinate supply chains and can align 
the incentives of the individual firms, leading to higher overall efficiency and higher 
gains for all parties, including the end-consumers. In fact, it may even be possible to 
achieve total coordination within the chain, i.e., the single integrated firm performance, 
by choosing the right contract parameters.  
 
2 
 
The common objectives of supply chain contracts are increasing the total supply chain 
profit, and sharing the profits, risks and information among the supply chain partners. 
To study contracting under demand uncertainty, supply chain researchers have utilized a 
simple game theoretical manufacturer-retailer supply chain model where the retailer 
faces the newsvendor problem. The manufacturer determines the contract parameters of 
the retailer’s problem. If the retailer accepts the contract, she needs to determine how 
much to order from manufacturer. If she does not accept the contract, both parties earn 
zero profit.  
 
This simple supply chain illustrates the strategic interaction between the two decision 
makers. The total supply chain expected profit is a function of the retailer’s order 
quantity; whereas it is the manufacturer’s contract offer that determines the parameters 
of the retailer’s decision problem. The retailer and the manufacturer’s incentives are not 
aligned with each other, which may lead to suboptimal profits for both firms. In 
particular, the manufacturer must design a contract that encourages the retailer to order 
a quantity that would maximize the manufacturer’s expected profit. This may require, 
for example, sharing some of the risk that the retailer faces.  
 
At the heart of all these models is the newsvendor model. This model, similar to all 
analytical models, depends on a number of behavioral assumptions about how human 
beings make decisions. Theory assumes that people are rational decision makers that 
aim to maximize expected profit level. However, most empirical studies have shown 
that people do not behave according to what theory predicts. To study the difference 
between theory and reality, researchers have started conducting “experiments” with 
human decision makers where human subjects make newsvendor decisions facing a 
computerized simulation. Using data from such experimental studies, researchers have 
identified a number of “decision biases” to explain deviations from theoretical 
predictions.  
 
In this thesis, we aim to explain the ordering decision behavior of retailers in such 
experiments. Contrary to most literature, our experiments involve human subjects that 
represent two firms in a supply chain: A manufacturer, who offers a contract, and a 
retailer who faces the newsvendor problem. This allows us to include the decision 
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biases due to the strategic interaction between two human decision makers that have 
conflicting incentives.  
 
We consider two different contracts between the firms: 
 Wholesale price contract (w): This contract has only one parameter, which is the 
wholesale price, w that the retailer pays to the manufacturer per unit she orders. 
Theory states that wholesale price contract causes retailer to order less than 
supply chain optimum order quantity, which leads to inefficiency.  
 
 Buyback contract (w, b): In a buyback contract, the manufacturer specifies a 
wholesale price w along with a buyback price b at which the retailer can return 
any unsold units at the end of the season. According to theory, the buyback 
contract can achieve supply chain coordination with a proper combination of the 
two parameters (w, b). Buyback contracts, in theory, may encourage retailers to 
increase the order quantity, potentially benefiting both firms.  
 
Using data from the experiments of Sahin and Kaya (2011), we aim to answer the 
following research questions: 
 
 Do the subjects follow “decision heuristics” while making their decisions? 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) identified several “decision heuristics” to explain 
the ordering behavior of retailer subjects in standard newsvendor experiments.  
We would like to understand whether such heuristics are present in our supply 
chain experiments where both firms are represented with human decision 
makers. 
 
 What factors do retailers consider in setting order quantities? In addition to 
following certain decision heuristics, retailer subjects’ decisions are also known 
to be affected by certain irrelevant factors, such as the profit level realized in the 
previous period or the expected profit share of the proposed contract. To identify 
the most effective factors, we build linear regression models to capture each 
retailer’s ordering behavior. We identify the independent variables of these 
regression models through “feature selection” methodology.  
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 Do subjects learn to make better decisions over time? We would like to 
understand if and how the subjects’ decisions change over time due to learning-
by-doing. 
 
 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we summarize the related 
literature. In Chapter 3, we discuss our simple manufacturer-retailer supply chain 
model, and provide information on the analytical background. In Chapter 4, we present 
our experimental design and procedure. In Chapter 5, we discuss the decision heuristics. 
Chapter 6 presents our selection of the factors and regression analyses study. In Chapter 
7, we discuss the learning effect in the newsvendor setting. In Chapter 8, we conclude 
with discussions and future research suggestions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2  LITERATURE SURVEY 
In this chapter we summarize the related literature on the newsvendor model and on 
supply chain contracting and coordination. 
 
2.1 The Newsvendor Model 
The newsvendor problem is an example of decision making in the face of uncertainty. It 
is traditionally motivated through the story of a newsvendor who needs to determine 
how many copies of a newspaper to order and stock at the beginning of a day to meet 
stochastic demand during the day. If demand turns out to be higher than her order 
quantity, the difference between order quantity and realized demand becomes left over 
units. If demand turns out to be lower than her order quantity, the newsvendor misses 
the chance of selling more units, and the absolute difference between order quantity and 
realized demand becomes lost sales. Addressing the trade-off between ordering too 
much and ordering too little, Arrow et al. (1951) came up with famous “critical ratio” 
solution to the newsvendor problem. 
 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) conducted the first laboratory study of the newsvendor 
problem. They observe the subjects’ orders to be pulled away from the optimal 
quantities towards the mean demand value. In particular, when the critical ratio was 
below 0.5 (the low profit condition), the subjects’ average order quantity is higher than 
the optimum order quantity. On the other hand, when the critical ratio is higher than 0.5 
(the high profit condition), the subjects’ average order quantity is lower than the 
optimum order quantity. They refer to this phenomenon as the “Pull to Center (PTC) 
effect” because in both cases the average orders are biased towards the center of the 
demand distribution.  Schweitzer and Cachon argue that these deviations cannot be 
explained by risk aversion, risk seeking, prospect theory, or a number of other possible 
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explanations. Instead, they offer the following three heuristics that can explain the 
observed deviations from the theoretical optimal. 
 Mean anchor heuristic implies anchoring on mean demand and insufficiently 
adjusting towards the optimum order quantity.  
 Demand chasing heuristic implies anchoring on previous order quantity and 
adjusting towards the previous demand realization.  
 Minimizing ex–post inventory error heuristic implies regretting from not 
ordering the previous period’s demand realization, even though there was no 
way to predict it.  
The first two heuristics are related to the “anchoring and insufficient adjustment” type 
heuristics (Kahneman et al. 1982) where people anchor their decisions around some 
available but irrelevant information, and insufficiently adjust around this value over 
time. One of the research questions we consider in this thesis research is to understand 
whether the subjects in our more complicated experiments (due to strategic interaction) 
also follow the decision heuristics of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000).  
 
Bolton and Katok (2008) observe the pull to center effect in their experiments that 
consists of three different studies. In the first study, they limit the number of ordering 
options from 100 to 9 and 3 respectively. They find that limiting the number of ordering 
options does not improve performance for both high and low profit conditions. In the 
second study, they show that providing information about the foregone options does not 
help improve performance. In the third study, they show that forcing the subjects to 
place ten-period standing orders improves performance. With standing orders, the 
subjects learn over time by taking long term decisions rather than focusing on short 
term fluctuations. 
 
Bostian et al. (2008) aim to explain the pull to center effect with an adaptive learning 
model, that consists of memory, reinforcement, and probabilistic choice elements. They 
conclude that subjects learn the attractiveness of each order quantity over time based on 
their past period experiences. Lurie and Swaminathan (2009) find that more frequent 
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feedback about the results of newsvendor decisions does not always improve 
performance.  
 
Benzion et al. (2008) study the newsvendor problem using two different demand 
distributions (uniform and normal) and two different marginal profit conditions (low 
and high). They find that in all cases learning occurs and is affected by the mean 
demand, the order-size of the maximum expected profit, and the demand level of the 
immediately preceding period. To capture the effect of the pull to center effect, the 
authors model the participants’ order quantity is a weighted average of the optimal order 
and the demand distribution mean.  
 
Benzion et al. (2010) study a similar setting with unknown demand distribution. 
According to their findings demand information does not improve the subjects’ profits. 
They investigate learning and in one of their hypothesis they claim that the personal 
order level deviation would become smaller over time. As a result of their experiments 
they show that the absolute change in the order quantity between two consecutive 
periods is reduced over time. They also used blocks of half periods and compared the 
subjects’ behavior in the first half of the periods block and the last half of the periods 
block. They claim that, this kind of analysis would emphasize the trend over time, if it 
exists. They show that the average order in the first half of the periods is significantly 
different from the average order in the last half of the periods. They conclude that 
subjects who knew the distribution used their knowledge to improve their order. 
 
Recently, Lau et al. (2014) question the existence of the pull to center effect. They show 
that while the pull to center effect can be observed in “group average” data, it does not 
exist in most individual subjects’ data. In a similar paper, Lau et al. (2012) question the 
existence of demand chasing. They show that some methods that researchers use to 
measure the heuristic (such as adjustment scores) may exaggerate the extent of demand 
chasing present in data. They recommend the use of simple correlation between the 
order quantity and the previous period demand realization.  
 
In addition to these heuristics, researchers have also studied the effects of certain factors 
(most irrelevant) to the retailer subjects order quantity decisions. Next, we briefly 
mention some of the most important ones of these factors: 
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Risk aversion: A risk-averse decision maker orders less than the optimum order 
quantity while a risk-seeking decision maker orders more than optimum order quantity 
(Eeckhoudt et al. 1995). Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) predicts that 
people act risk averse in the domain of gains, but risk-seeking in the domain of losses 
(reflection effect). 
 
Loss aversion: A loss averse decision maker prefers avoiding losing rather than 
obtaining gains. Wang and Webster (2009) show that when shortage cost is low, a loss-
averse decision maker orders less than a rational decision maker; whereas, when the 
shortage cost is high, a loss-averse decision maker’s order quantity is more than a 
rational decision maker. Loss averse people tend to avoid situations where probabilities 
are unknown (uncertainty about uncertainty), and order less than the optimum order 
quantity, because losses result larger disutility than the value derived from the same size 
of gains (Camerer and Weber 1992).   
 
Framing: Framing describes how the subjects behave when the emphasis on loses and 
gains change. Shultz et al. (2007) compare a positive newsvendor frame where the gain 
is emphasized with a negative frame where the loss is emphasized. No difference was 
detected between the frames. Kremer et al. (2010) compare the results of newsvendor 
experiments under two frames: In the “operations frame”, the subjects simply make the 
standard newsvendor decisions using a standard newsvendor story. In the “neutral 
frame”, the decisions are the same but the story is not given in the newsvendor context. 
Rather, it is given in a generic frame. The authors conclude that the neutral frame is 
closer to the optimal in both low and high profit conditions. 
 
Bounded rationality: Standard economic theory assumes that people rationally choose 
the “best response” among alternatives. However, in practice, people make noisy 
decisions. They may make calculation or recording errors due to limited cognitive 
ability, limited memory and attention span. When faced with complex decision 
situations, people may resort to decision heuristics as shortcuts. Su (2008) indicates that 
the pull to center effect observed in newsvendor experiments can be explained by 
bounded rationality with a quantal response equilibrium framework. The author 
concludes that subjects do not always make the best decision, but the good decisions are 
more likely to occur rather than the worse ones. Gavirneni and Isen (2010) use a verbal 
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protocol analysis to understand the logic behind the decision makers’ decisions in 
newsvendor game. They conclude that most subjects were successful in calculating 
underage and overage costs but failed to transform them into optimum order quantity. 
This finding suggests that the newsvendor problem may not be as intuitive as thought 
by researchers. 
 
Irrational Behavior: Becker-Peth et al. (2013) show that orders can be predicted 
accurately even human subjects is irrational. They derive response functions for mean 
orders, variance of orders and expected profit to predict actual human behavior, and use 
the models to design supply chain contracts instead of newsvendor model. The authors 
show that the order quantity not only depends on the critical ratio but also on the 
wholesale price and buyback price. They conclude that the model they derived is quite 
better than the newsvendor model.  
 
Overconfidence: Croson et al. (2013) find that overconfident decision makers make 
suboptimal decisions in the newsvendor problem. Bolton et al. (2012) compare the 
performance of undergraduate students, master students and managers in the 
newsvendor game. The authors conclude that managers do not perform better than two 
student groups and students, especially graduates, are better in using the given 
information that helps find the optimum solution.  
 
Cultural differences: Feng et al. (2010) conducted experiments in order to analyze the 
cross–national differences between Chinese and American subjects. The results show 
that Chinese subjects’ decisions are more anchored to mean demand than American 
subjects. The authors also re-examine “thinning set of orders” (Bolton and Katok 2008). 
They show that when the optimum order is one of the middle options not the extreme 
one, supply chain efficiency increases and the percentage of choosing the optimum 
order quantity increases. 
 
Gender Differences: Vericourt et al. (2013) investigate the effect of gender differences 
in newsvendor game. They measure whether there are significant gender differences in 
ordering behavior in the newsvendor problem. They conclude that in low profit 
condition, there is no significant difference between males and females, but in high 
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profit condition, men tend to have greater risk appetite and tend to order more than 
women. 
 
2.2  Supply Chain Contracting and Coordination 
In Section 2.1, we have discussed the newsvendor problem which is related to the order 
quantity decision of a single decision maker. Here we discuss the literature on supply 
chain coordination, which deals with the decisions of at least two firms (i.e., decision 
makers) that are in a strategic relationship with each other. Each member of the chain 
aims to maximize its own profit. This decentralized decision structure leads to 
suboptimal total chain profit, as in the case of the famous double marginalization 
problem (Spengler 1950). 
 
Supply chain contracting literature mainly focuses on how different contract types can 
be used to align the incentives of the different chain members, which are referred to as 
the “coordination” of the chain. Coordination allows the total expected supply chain 
profit to be maximized, and be equal to that of an integrated firm. The contract also 
determines how the total profit and risk due to uncertain demand will be shared between 
the chain members. Most popular contract types in the literature include the buyback 
(Pasternack 1985), revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005), and quantity 
flexibility (Tsay 1999) contracts.  
 
Pasternack (1985) shows that it is possible for a manufacturer to determine a returns 
policy (buyback contract) that achieves channel coordination. If the manufacturer 
allows only partial returns, selling price and return policy becomes a function of the 
retailer’s order quantity; whereas, if the manufacturer can buy back all unsold units (an 
unlimited return policy) then the return policy is independent from retailer’s order 
quantity decision. Emmons and Gilbert (1998) also analyze return policies and find 
what combination of wholesale price and return policy maximizes manufacturer’s 
expected profit. They conclude that retailer price increases with increased uncertainty 
and manufacturer gains more profit with buying back unsold units from the retailer.  
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Kandel (1996) studies different types of contracts that try to allocate the risk between 
manufacturer and retailer for the unsold inventory. The author shows that manufacturers 
prefer consignment contracts, where retailers prefer the no return contract.  
 
Next, we outline the experimental/behavioral works on supply chain contracting: 
 
Keser and Paleologo (2004) conducted a laboratory experiment that investigates the 
simple wholesale price contract. The average wholesale price is observed to be lower 
than the optimum. Retailers order lower than the optimum order quantity to a given 
wholesale price. No evidence is found to support Schweitzer and Cachon’s pull to 
center effect and chasing demand heuristic. Supplier’s realized profit is lower but 
retailer’s realized profit is higher than then theoretical prediction, which implies a more 
balanced profit distribution.  
 
In this thesis we aim to understand the reason why the retailers deviate from the optimal 
newsvendor solution, by using Keser and Paleologo’s parameter setting as our base 
model. In addition to aggregate-level analysis, we also analyze each retailer’s decision 
individually. To understand what factors the retailer subjects consider in their order 
quantity decisions, we apply feature selection to each individual decision maker’s 
quantity decision (Guyon and Elisseeff 2003). 
 
Katok and Wu (2009) conducted a laboratory experiment that compares buyback 
contract, wholesale contract and revenue sharing contract to each other. In order to 
eliminate human decision maker’s biases, human retailers play the game with a 
computerized supplier, and human suppliers play the game with a computerized retailer. 
The authors find revenue sharing and buyback contracts to perform better than the 
wholesale price contract but fail to achieve channel coordination. Retailers’ decisions 
are more likely show minimizing ex post inventory error than anchoring and 
insufficiently adjustment heuristic. The difference between buyback and revenue 
sharing contracts stems from framing of contract types diminishes over time. 
 
Wu (2013) studies the impact of repeated interactions on supply chain contracts by 
comparing the wholesale price, buyback price and revenue sharing contracts. The author 
observes that buyback contracts behave differently from revenue sharing contracts by 
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inducing higher order quantities over time and also finds that the behaviors of both the 
retailer and the supplier deviate from the predictions of the traditional contracting 
model. The results of the study imply that various contracts can perform differently 
based upon how the bargaining is distributed within a channel. 
 
Hyndman et al. (2012) consider a two-firm supply chain where the sales are constrained 
by the capacity choice that each firm makes simultaneously before demand realization. 
The authors analyze the difference between fixed and random matching on coordination 
between players. Fixed matching setting is similar to our long-run experiments, and 
random matching is similar to our short run experiments. The efficiency of fixed match 
is found to be higher in initial periods, but the situation gets reversed at the last five 
periods of the game, which is counterintuitive. This is explained by the first impression 
bias. Learning is also found to be slower under fixed matching.  
 
There are also papers in literature where the retailer faces deterministic demand, hence, 
is not a newsvendor. These papers are related to our work in that they also study 
behavioral issues between supply chain members.  Lim and Ho (2007) study the effect 
of the number of blocks in a contract. A two-block tariff contract is found to increase 
supply chain efficiency more than a linear price contract; however, the increase in 
efficiency is lower than expected. If the numbers of blocks increase to three, supply 
chain efficiency improves further, and the manufacturer’s profit share increases. The 
authors propose a Quantal-Response Equilibrium (QRE) model to explain the 
counterintuitive results, and to better understand the retailer’s sensitivity to 
counterfactual profits. 
 
Loch and Wu (2008) study the effect of social preferences on supply chain 
coordination. Social preferences refer to concerns about the other firm’s welfare, 
reciprocity stem from positive relationship, and desire of a higher relative payoff 
compared to the other firm when the status is salient. Lock and Wu’s experiments 
compare the “control condition” in which players are given simple incentives only, 
“relationship condition” in which the players are assumed to have a friendship, and 
“status seeking condition” in which players are assumed to compete with each other. In 
the relationship condition, both parties are found to set prices lower than optimum, and 
in status seeking condition, both parties set selling prices higher than optimum. Hence, 
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there is evidence that individuals’ preference for social relationships may lead to higher 
than expected cooperation leading to higher profits; whereas, preference for status may 
lead to destructive actions, leading to inefficiency.  
 
Cui et al. (2007) discuss how fairness concerns may help achieve channel coordination. 
Using analytical model, the authors show that supply chain coordination can be 
achieved even with a simple wholesale price contract when the parties are sufficiently 
concerned about fairness. 
 
Haruvy et al. (2012) compare coordinating contracts such as two part tariff (TPT) and 
minimum order quantity (MOQ) to wholesale price contract under two different 
bargaining structures: In Ultimatum Bargaining (UB) the least possible bargaining 
power is given to the retailer, whereas in Structured Bargaining (SB), retailer has a 
bargaining power. Results show that under UB, only TPT contract is more efficient than 
wholesale price contract but under SB, both TPT and MOQ contracts are more efficient 
than the wholesale price contract. Structured bargaining achieves nearly full channel 
efficiency.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3 ANALYTICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1  The Supply Chain Scenario 
We consider a typical supply chain scenario, where a manufacturer produces a certain 
product at a unit production cost of c, and a retailer buys this product from the 
manufacturer and sells it to its customers (consumers) at a sales price of p. Consumer 
demand is probabilistic with cumulative distribution function F(.).  
 
The sequence of events is as follows: At the beginning of the relation, the manufacturer 
sets the parameters of the contract and offers the contract to the retailer. One of the 
contract parameters is the wholesale price, w. Manufacturer sells his product to the 
retailer at this price. Depending on the contract type, the contract may include other 
parameters. If the retailer’s expected profit is positive, she accepts the contract. In this 
case, she chooses her order (stock) quantity q, and orders this quantity from the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer produces and delivers these units to the retailer before 
the selling season. If the retailer’s expected profit with her optimal order quantity is 
negative, the retailer rejects the contract. 
 
During the sales season, random consumer demand is realized as “D”. The retailer 
tries to satisfy this demand by using her stock of product. The sales quantity of the 
retailer is the minimum of her order quantity q and the realized demand. Two cases are 
possible: 
 
 If the realized consumer demand turns out to be less than the retailer’s order 
quantity (i.e., D<q), the retailer will sell D units, and (q-D) products will be 
unsold (leftover products). These products have zero salvage value.  
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 If the realized consumer demand turns out to be higher than the retailer’s order 
quantity (i.e., If D>q), the retailer will sell all q units, and (D-q) units of demand 
will be unsatisfied (unsatisfied demand). There is no extra penalty for 
unsatisfied demand to either firm; however, the firms lose the opportunity to 
make more profit.  
Each firm tries to maximize its own expected profit in the game. Note that, the expected 
profit of each firm depends not only on its own decision, but also on the other firm’s 
decision and also on the random demand. Thus, there exists a strategic interaction 
between the two firms.  
 
The sequence of events can be summarized as follows: 
1. The manufacturer offers the contract, by specifying its parameters. 
2. If the retailer’s expected profit level is non-negative, the retailer accepts the 
contract and determines her order quantity q. 
3. The manufacturer produces q units at a cost of c each, and sends these to retailer. 
4. Sales period arrives and the random consumer demand D realizes at the retailer. 
 
3.2  Supply-Chain Optimal Solution 
We first determine the supply chain optimal solution before discussing the solutions 
under different contract types. In this scenario, a single decision maker makes all 
decisions with the objective of maximizing the total supply chain (manufacturer + 
retailer) expected profit. The supply chain’s problem is formulated as 
 
                
  ( )        (   )        
 
This is also a newsvendor problem, but this time it is faced by the whole supply chain. 
Note that the contract parameters are irrelevant for the supply chain’s problem because 
contract decisions are between the firms of the supply chain. The order quantity that 
maximizes the supply chain’s expected profit is calculated as: 
       (
  
     
)     (
   
 
). 
(1) 
q 
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The supply chain’s expected profit with order quantity qsc is equal to 
 
      
  (   )        (     )          
(2)     
In this thesis, we study decentralized supply chains where the manufacturer and the 
retailer are independent firms. Each independent firm considers only its own profit 
margin in making decisions, not the total supply chain profit margin. Such decentralized 
decision making results in inefficiencies, known as the “double marginalization’ 
problem (Spengler 1950).  
 
From the equation above, we observe that the supply chain expected profit is a function 
of the retailer’s order quantity decision q. The supply chain achieves its theoretical 
maximum expected profit when the retailer chooses q
sc
. This maximum profit level is 
known as the integrated firm profit, or the centralized solution. 
 
The ratio of the total (manufacturer + retailer) expected profit level under a contract to 
the integrated firm profit is known as contract efficiency. A contract that achieves 100% 
efficiency is said to be coordinating the supply chain. In this case, the incentives of the 
firms are aligned, and inefficiencies due to double marginalization are eliminated. 
Coordination requires the retailer to choose the integrated firm order quantity q
sc
. Any 
other order quantity choice will cause suboptimal total expected profit level in the 
supply chain.  
 
While the retailer’s order quantity decision determines the total supply chain profit, the 
manufacturer’s contract parameter decision has three functions: 
 
 They affect the retailer’s order quantity q, which in fact determine the total 
expected supply chain profit.  
 They determine how the total supply chain profit will be shared (in expectation) 
between the two firms. 
 They determine how the risk due to uncertain consumer demand will be shared 
(in expectation with respect to random demand) between the two firms. 
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We present the theoretical solution for a given customer demand distribution with cdf 
F(.). In our experiments, consumer demand is uniformly distributed between 
(         ). For this distribution, one can further characterize the optimal order 
quantity of the retailer as  
 
   (        )   (
  
     
)  (         )       .  
(3)    
Next, using q
*
(contract), one determines the optimal contract parameters of the 
manufacturer by solving the manufacturer’s problem. Similar to standard game-
theoretical models, the manufacturer is assumed to foresee the retailer’s q*(contract) 
choice for any contract offer. That is, the manufacturer can solve the retailer’s problem. 
Taking the retailer’s q*(contract) reaction into account, the manufacturer determines the 
contract parameters that maximize his own expected profit.  
 
The manufacturer’s objective function is in general not jointly concave in the contract 
parameters. Hence, one cannot find a closed form solution for the manufacturer’s 
problem. Instead, one can use a numeric procedure to determine the manufacturer’s 
optimal contract parameters through a grid search over possible parameter 
combinations. Using these contract parameters, one can then calculate the retailer’s 
order quantity, expected sales quantity, and the expected profits of the two firms. These 
values characterize the outcome of the game for the given values of model parameter. 
 
Next, we derive the solution of the game separately under the wholesale price and 
buyback contracts.  
 
3.3  Wholesale Price Contract (WSP) Model 
 
This contract only has one parameter, the wholesale price, w. Theory states that the 
wholesale price contract causes the retailer to order less than supply chain optimum 
order quantity, which leads to inefficiency. Given the contract (w), the retailer’s 
problem is 
 
            
 ( )        (   )    . 
q 
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From the standard critical fractile solution, the retailer’s optimal order quantity satisfies 
 
  ( )     (
   
 
)  
(4) 
Comparing Equations (1) and (4) we observe that the wholesale price contract cannot 
coordinate the supply chain unless the manufacturer sets w=c. Such a choice is unlikely 
because it yields zero expected profit to the manufacturer. Having only one parameter, 
this contract type fails to align the incentives of the two firms.  
 
For uniformly distributed demand, the retailer’s unique order quantity solution becomes 
 
  ( )   {
     
 (         )
 
       
                                              
   . 
 
Substituting q
w
(w), the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
            
  (   )    . 
 
The objective function of the manufacturer is quadratic and concave in the interval 
      and is equal to zero if w>p. Manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price is found as  
 
      {     
 
 
  
 
 
    
         
}. 
 
Alternatively, one may use a numeric procedure to determine the manufacturer’s 
optimal wholesale price, w
w
, through a grid search over possible w values. Using this 
wholesale price, one can then calculate the retailer’s order quantity, expected sales 
quantity, and the expected profits of the two firms. 
 
 
w 
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3.4  Buyback (BB) Contract Model 
 
Under a buyback contract, the manufacturer specifies a wholesale price w along with a 
buyback price b at which the retailer can return any unsold units at the end of the 
season. By this contract, the manufacturer reduces the retailer’s cost of overage, 
encouraging the retailer to set a higher order quantity.  The retailer’s problem becomes, 
            
        (   )           (   )     
     (   )     (   )  (   )   
    
The retailer’s cost of overage becomes w-b while the cost of underage is p-w. 
Accordingly, the retailer’s optimal order quantity is found as: 
 
                                         (   )         (
  
     
)       (
   
   
)   
(5)                       
Comparing Equations (1) and (5), one can show that the supply chain will be 
coordinated if the buyback contract parameters satisfy    
 (   )
   
.   
 
Substituting q
b
(w,b), the manufacturer’s problem becomes 
 
                           
  (   )            (    ) . 
 
This function is not jointly concave in w and b. One can determine the optimal contract 
parameters through a grid search over the w and b values.  
 
3.5  Our Parameter Setting and Solution 
 
We consider the following model parameter values:  
 Unit production cost,     . 
 Retail price,      . 
 Zero salvage value. 
q 
w, b 
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 Demand uniformly distributed between 40 and 230, and can take only integer 
values. 
 The decision variables (     ) are expected to take only integer values.  
 
This parameter setting is the same as the one used by Keser and Paleologo (2004). 
Given these parameters, the manufacturer’s wholesale price satisfies          .  
For a chosen w, the buyback price satisfies      . The subgame-perfect 
equilibrium solutions under the two contracts are summarized in table below. 
 
Table 3.5.1: Comparison of Manufacturer’s Optimal Solution under Two Contracts 
Contract Type 
Total 
Profit 
Contract 
Efficiency 
Mfg. 
Profit 
Retailer 
Profit 
w b q 
Buyback 23,123 98.50% 22,784 333 247 246 183 
Wholesale Price 17,137 74.00% 12,126 5,011 176 -- 96 
 
We observe that the manufacturer’s optimal solution under the buyback contract 
dominates the solution under the wholesale price contract in terms of total profit. This is 
primarily due to differences between the retailer’s order quantities. In fact, the 
efficiency of the buyback contract is close to 100%, which is good news from the 
supply chain point of view. However, the profit distribution under this contract is quite 
unbalanced. Almost all profit is going to the manufacturer. The wholesale price 
contract, on the other hand, while inefficient, offers the retailer a decent profit level.  
 
Note that this is only a theoretical comparison which assumes that (1) the retailer will 
accept any contract that provides her nonzero expected profit; (2) the retailer will 
determine her order quantity according to the newsvendor formula; (3) the manufacturer 
will be able to foresee the retailer’s reaction to any contract offer.  As we will discuss in 
this thesis, these assumptions are questionable when real human beings make decisions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
In this chapter we present the experimental design and experimental procedure. We use 
the data of experiments that were conducted by, and reported in Sahin and Kaya (2011). 
 
4.1  Experimental Design 
 
The experimental design is illustrated in Table 4.1.1, where n denotes the number of 
subjects. Two different contract types (wholesale price and buyback contracts) and two 
relationship length types (long run and short run) were studied
1
. In the long run 
experiments, the same manufacturer-retailer pair interacts throughout all 30 periods, 
whereas in the short run experiments, the pairs are re-determined in each period.  
 
Table 4.1.1: Experimental Design and Number of Subjects 
  
Contract Type 
  
Buyback Wholesale price 
R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
 L
en
g
th
 
L
o
n
g
 r
u
n
 
Experiment b1a, n=12 
Experiment b1b, n=16 
Experiment w1a, n=16 
Experiment w1b, n=14 
Experiment w1c, n=16 
S
h
o
rt
 r
u
n
 
Experiment b2a, n=16 
Experiment b2b, n=16 
Experiment w2a, n=14 
Experiment w2b, n=16 
Experiment w2c, n=14 
 
                                                          
1 WL will refer to the wholesale price contract, long run experiments, WS to the wholesale price contract, short run 
experiments. BL and BS denote the counterparts for the buyback contract. 
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4.2  Experimental Procedure 
Sahin and Kaya conducted their computer-based experiments at the CAFE (Center for 
Applied Finance Education) computer laboratory of Sabancı University, Faculty of 
Management. They coded
2
 and implemented the experimental model using HP MUMS 
Software.  
 
Subjects were selected from Sabancı University MS 401 course spring semester 
2010/2011 students. These students had already studied the basic newsvendor problem. 
To provide incentive, each subject’s total profit at the end of the experimental session 
was converted into a bonus grade for the course MS 401. The bonus ranged between 1% 
and 2.5%, and it is applied to the final grade of the subject in that course.  
 
Instructions were delivered to subjects before they arrive at the laboratory. Sample 
instructions are provided in Appendix C. At the beginning of each session, instructors 
explained the experiment once again to ensure that the instructions are clearly 
understood, and they answered any remaining questions. Before starting the actual 
experiment, they let the subjects play three pilot (training) periods. During the actual 
experiments, they did not allow the subjects to communicate with each other. Each 
experimental session took around two hours.  
 
Each experimental session contained one experiment (treatment) composed of 30 
independent periods (rounds). Throughout a given experiment, a particular subject 
played the role of either manufacturer or retailer. The role was randomly assigned at the 
beginning of the experiment and remained unchanged in all of the 30 periods.  
 
The term “game” denotes the interaction in a manufacturer-retailer pair in a given 
period. The sequence of events in the game reflects the three stage interaction in the 
analytical model. At stage I of the game, the manufacturer sets the contract parameters 
wholesale price and buyback price (in buyback contract experiments). At stage II, these 
contract parameters are displayed on the retailer’s screen and the retailer determines her 
order quantity. At stage III, random consumer demand is realized. The results of the 
                                                          
2  Appendix A provides the main script code that is used to define the number of subjects, and to call other functional 
scripts, as an example. Appendix B illustrates another important part of the code where the parameters, stages and the 
allocation strategy of subjects to the roles are defined. 
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game are then reported to the subjects. Each subject is given around 30 seconds to make 
his decision.  
 
Appendices D and E provide sample screenshots of the manufacturer and the retailer’s 
screens respectively in the buyback contract experiments. The large table in the middle 
of the screen is the “decision support tool”. By using this tool, the subjects could run 
what-if analysis before submitting their decisions. A retailer subject can enter an order 
quantity to this tool and obtain the outcome for eight different realizations of the 
stochastic consumer demand (For D = 40, 70, 100, 130, 160, 190, 220, 230). The 
manufacturer also has a decision support tool. However, he needs to enter contract 
parameters (w, b), as well as a value for the retailer’s order quantity decision to the tool. 
More detailed explanation about the decision support tool can be found in Appendix C.  
 
Subjects enter their decisions into the cells at the bottom of the screens. At the end of 
each period, a results screen (as seen in Appendix F) provides the subjects with the 
results of their game. The game results include the consumer demand realization, the 
decisions of both firms, number of units sold, and number of units unsold, demand 
unsatisfied, the period profit and cumulative profit of both firms. These results are 
provided for all periods up to and including the last period.  
 
After each experiment, a post-experiment survey is conducted where they asked the 
subjects how they made their decisions, whether they were motivated by the bonus 
grade and their suggestions. These surveys indicated that the subjects were highly 
motivated for their decisions, and their responses yield clues about their decision 
heuristics.  
 
4.3 Experimental Data Analysis 
Recall that the outcome of a game is shaped by first the manufacturer’s decision, second 
the retailer’s decision and third the realization of random consumer demand. We use the 
following terms to differentiate the predictions at different levels: 
 
1) Manufacturer’s optimal outcome: The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the model 
corresponds to the manufacturer’s optimal outcome (in each period). This is because the 
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manufacturer is the first-mover in the game. In this outcome, the manufacturer offers 
the contract (w
*
=247, b
*
=246), and the retailer stocks the corresponding newsvendor 
quantity q
*
(w
*
, b
*
) = 183.  Manufacturer’s expected profit is 22,790 and retailer’s 
expected profit is 333. This is what the theory predicts as the outcome of the overall 
interaction between the two firms in a given period. 
 
2) Newsvendor’s predicted outcome: In experiments, manufacturer subjects do not 
necessarily offer their optimal contract (w
*
, b
*). We define the “predicted outcome” as 
the expected outcome of the interaction given any contract (w, b), assuming that the 
retailer chooses the newsvendor order quantity q
*
(w, b). The difference between the 
“predicted outcome” and real experiment data is due to the retailer’s deviation from the 
newsvendor model, and due to the realization of random demand.  
 
3) Expected outcome: Retailer subjects also often deviate from the newsvendor order 
quantity decision. For any contract (w, b) and retailer’s response q (w, b), the “expected 
outcome” denotes the expected result with respect to consumer demand distribution. 
 
Next, we present our results. We aim to answer the following research questions: 
 Do retailer subjects follow certain decision heuristics while making their 
decisions?  
 What factors do retailers consider in setting their order quantities? 
 Do subjects learn to make better decisions over time?  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5 RETAILER’S DECISION HEURISTICS 
Human decision makers are known to employ decision heuristics. These heuristics can 
have considerable effect in shaping managerial behavior (Bazerman 2008). Retailers in 
standard newsvendor experiments are known to use two such heuristics: Mean 
anchoring heuristic and demand chasing heuristic. Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) 
showed that the well known “pull to center effect” can be explained by either of these 
heuristics. In both cases, experimental order decisions are “pulled” towards the mean of 
the demand distribution, away from the optimal newsvendor quantities. 
 
In this study, we aim to understand whether the retailer subjects in our experiments 
followed these two heuristics, and whether they exhibit the pull to center effect.  
 
In standard newsvendor experiments, in all periods the retailer faces the same contract 
offered by the computer. Our experimental setting differs in two respects:  
 The optimal order quantity (q*) for the retailer’s problem changes from one 
period to the other based on the offered contract.  
 The strategic relationship between the manufacturer and retailer players affects 
the retailer’s quantity choice. The retailer, for example may set a substantially 
low order quantity to “warn” the manufacturer for offering a bad contract. She 
may even order the minimum possible quantity or reject the contract.  
Due to these differences, measuring the effects of the decision heuristics on retailer’s 
order quantity in our experimental setting is a difficult task.  
5.1 The Pull to Center Effect 
Extensive research has demonstrated the existence of the pull to center effect in 
empirical newsvendor behavior (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, Benzion et al. 2008, 
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Bolton and Katok 2008, Bostian et al. 2008, Lurie and Swaminathan 2009, Kremer et al. 
2010). This implies that instead of ordering the optimal order quantity (q
*
), subjects 
order a quantity between q
* 
and the mean demand value d . We will refer to this region 
as the “pull to center zone” (PTC zone).  Note that the PTC zone in our experiments 
will be re-defined at each period based on the q
* 
value that is implied by the offered 
contract. 
 
Figure 5.1.1 illustrates the data of a retailer subject from our experiments who exhibits 
significant pull to center behavior. Note how the subjects’ order quantities are pulled 
towards the mean demand and away from the optimal order quantity in most periods.  
 
 
Figure 5.1.1: A Subject that Illustrates Pull to Center Effect 
 
5.1.1  Percentage of Orders in PTC Zone 
To understand whether our retailer subjects exhibited pull to center behavior, we check 
the percentage of orders that fall into the PTC zone (Similar to Lau et al. 2014).We 
ignore the data of periods in which q=0 or q
*
= d . We calculated this percentage for 
each retailer in each experiment type separately. The resulting histograms are presented 
in Figure 5.1.2. We observe that in all experiment types, the percentage of orders that 
fall into the PTC zone is quite small for most retailers. From Figure 5.1.3 and Figure 
5.1.4 we also observe that in the long run experiments the percentage of orders in PTC 
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zone are generally higher than the short run experiments, and in buyback experiments 
the percentage of orders in PTC zone is smaller than the wholesale price experiments. 
           
          
Figure 5.1.2: Percentage of Orders in the PTC Zone 
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Figure 5.1.3: Cumulative Distribution of Percentage of Orders in PTC Zone in 
Wholesale Price Experiments 
 
 
Figure 5.1.4: Cumulative Distribution of Percentage of Orders in PTC Zone in Buyback 
Experiments 
 
5.1.2 Regression-based Analysis 
Another way to test whether subjects exhibit the PTC effect is through the following 
regression equation (similar to Bostian et.al 2008).   
   d   ( 
      d  )     
(6) 
Here, the parameter “α” reflects the extent that the subjects deviate from the mean 
demand toward the optimal order quantity. To be consistent with the pull to center 
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effect, this parameter should fall into the interval (0,1). We determined the “α” values 
for each individual retailer subject separately by regressing (qt - d
 
) on (q
* 
- d
 
). Figure 
5.1.5 shows the cumulative distribution of α-coefficient obtained from individual 
regressions. 
 
Figure 5.1.5: Cumulative Distribution of α-coefficient 
 
We find 70% of subjects in WL, 82% in WS, 57% in BL, and 50% in BS experiments to 
have α-coefficients outside the interval (0,1) which is not consistent with the pull to 
center effect. In addition, by checking the p-values of the coefficients, only 4% of 
subjects in WL, 14% in WS, 29% in BL, and 31% in BS with α-coefficients inside (0,1) 
are found to be significant at 0.05 level.  
 
We also conduct an individual-effects regression study based on aggregate data at 
experiment level. Table 5.1.1 presents the results. Contrary to the individual level 
analysis, the aggregate data of each experiment type except the WS experiments, is 
found to have α-coefficients inside (0,1) and is significant at the 0.05 level. Table 5.1.1 
indicates the aggregate α-coefficients. 
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Table 5.1.1: Aggregate Regression Study Results 
Experiment 
Type 
α-coefficient p-value  Adj. R2 
Number of 
Data Points 
Proportion of Retailers 
with Significant 
Regression Equation 
WL 0.90 0.00 38.75 637 0,70 
WS 1.02 0.00 49.12 643 0,55 
BL 0.99 0.00 46.78 380 0,79 
BS 0.79 0.00 37.65 450 0,50 
 
These findings imply that one should be careful in discussing pull to center results 
reported in literature. While PTC can be claimed to exist based on aggregate level data, 
the individual level analysis can tell a different story. Aggregate averages can be 
misleading; therefore the pull to center effect does not accurately describe individual 
behavior. This finding parallels the results of Lau et al. (2014) that were obtained for a 
standard newsvendor experiment. 
 
5.1.3 The Difficulty of Observing the Pull to Center Effect 
Next, we discuss why it is difficult to observe the PTC effect at individual level in our 
experimental setting. Recall that the PTC effect requires the order quantity to fall 
between the mean demand (which is 135 in our study), and the optimal order quantity 
which is contract-dependent. This PTC zone is a quite wide interval in most standard 
newsvendor experiments. For example, in Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), the region is 
from 150 to 225, whereas in Bolton and Katok (2008), it is from 50 to 75 in high profit 
experiments. 
 
The difficulty in our study is that our variable size of PTC zone is quite narrow. This is 
because the optimal q
*
 value turns out to be close to the mean demand value of 135 for 
most contract offers. This is shown in Figure 5.1.6 which plots the distribution of 
optimal order quantities in all offered contracts (2250 data points).  
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Figure 5.1.6: Distribution of Optimal Order Quantities 
 
Next, we introduce two heuristics that can lead to the pull to center effect, and discuss if 
we can find evidence for these heuristics in our data.  
 
5.2 The Mean Anchor Heuristic 
Under the mean anchor heuristic, the retailer first sets an order quantity (i.e., anchors) 
around the mean demand value ( d ), and over time adjust towards the optimal order 
quantity (q
*
) both in high and low profit conditions. 
 
5.2.1 Counting Changes Anchoring and Adjustments 
We count the number of periods, where the retailer’s order quantity is between the 
optimal order quantity (q
*
) and the mean demand ( d ). We ignore the cases in which 
qt=0 or q
*
=d . From Table 5.2.1, we observe that the proportion of anchoring periods at 
the aggregate level is well below the 50% level for all experiments. The subject level 
results are given in Figure 5.1.2. 
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Table 5.2.1: The Anchoring Results at Aggregate Level 
Experiment 
Type 
The Aggregate 
Proportion of 
Anchoring 
WL 27% 
WS 27% 
BL 27% 
BS 21% 
 
 
5.2.2 Adjustment Scores 
Here we present a method that can measure the magnitude of the heuristic in the periods 
where anchoring is observed. Following Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), we define the 
adjustment scores as (q- d )/ (q
*
- d ) in the high margin condition, and as ( d - q)/ ( d -q
*
)
 
in the low profit cases. 
 
We ignore the data of periods in which qt=0 or q
*
=d . Figure 5.3.1 shows the 
percentage distribution of adjustment scores values in periods. We observe that the 
average adjustment scores of anchoring periods to be around 0.5.  
5.3  Demand Chasing Heuristic 
Under the demand chasing heuristic, the retailer adjusts his order quantity towards the 
demand realization in the previous period. Newsvendor behavior literature has 
suggested that individuals engage in demand chasing (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000, 
Benzion et al. 2008, Bostian et al. 2008, Lurie and Swaminathan 2009, Kremer et al. 
2010). 
 
In a standard newsvendor experiment where q
* 
is fixed, this heuristic predicts that  
 qt > qt-1   if   dt-1 > qt-1  
 qt < qt-1   if   dt-1 < qt-1  
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Figure 5.3.1: The Distribution of Adjustment Scores 
 
Note that the demand chasing heuristic is not related to the optimal order quantity q
*
. 
Also, the heuristic does not predict initial choices, but it predicts adjustment patterns 
across a series of choices (Schweitzer and Cachon 2000).  
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Researchers have measured the effect of demand chasing heuristic using the following 
methods: 
 Counting changes towards versus away from prior demand 
 Adjustment scores 
 Regression 
 Correlation 
Lau et al. (2012) criticize the use of the first three measures. They show these methods 
to overestimate the extent of demand chasing (i.e., a high false positive rate), and 
recommend the fourth one, correlation.  
 
Next, we present the analyses of our experimental data using each of these approaches. 
We also explain how we modified the approaches to address the changing q
*
 at each 
period.  
 
5.3.1 Counting Changes Towards vs. Away From Prior Demand 
This method is based on comparing the number of adjustments in the order quantity 
towards and away from the prior demand realization. For standard newsvendor 
decisions, qt – qt-1 and dt-1 – qt-1 being of the same sign is counted as an adjustment 
towards the prior demand; whereas being opposite sign is an adjustment away from it. 
Note that this “standard metric” ignores the changes in qt
* 
from period to period.  
 
To adopt this metric to our data, we came up with a “new metric” that tracks the 
changes in overage or underage percentages rather than the changes in order quantity 
itself. The idea is that if the retailer is chasing demand, her overage or underage 
percentage should be changing in the direction of prior demand realization. To this end, 
we define as the qpt = (qt - qt
*
)/qt
* 
overage percentage in period t with respect to the 
optimal quantity qt
*
. Positive values of qpt indicate overage percentage and the 
negatives ones indicate underage percentage.  
 
Using this metric, we count the numbers of adjustments towards and away from prior 
demand value. In particular, we count (qpt – qpt-1) and (dt-1 – qt-1) being of the same sign 
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as an adjustment towards the prior demand; and being opposite signs as an adjustment 
away. A proportion of changes towards greater than 0.5 suggests demand chasing. 
 
We ignore the data of periods in which qt =0 or dt-1= qt-1 or qpt-1= qpt. For each 
experiment type, we report the results both at the subject and aggregate level. Figure 
5.3.2 shows the percentage of order adjustments toward prior demand at subject level. 
 
The results say that in all experiment types most of the retailers have an order 
adjustment proportion greater than 0.5. However; out of these adjustments, 52% in WL, 
41% in WS, 36% in BL, and 31% in BS of retailers are significant. A retailer’s use of 
the heuristic is said to be significant if the proportion of qp adjustments towards prior 
demand is significant by the binomial test at 0.10 level.  
 
Next, we present the aggregate results where we pool the data of all retailers together 
for each experiment type. From Table 5.3.1, we observe that in all four experiment 
types, the proportion of qp adjustments towards prior demand is significantly higher 
than the changes away. We also observe that results under our new metric and the 
standard metric are not different from each other. This is probably due to the pooling 
effects of aggregation. 
 
Table 5.3.1: The Proportion of Adjustments Toward and Away From Prior Demand at 
Aggregate Level 
 
 
Under Standard Metric Under New Metric 
 Experiment 
Type Toward Away Toward Away 
p-value of the 
Binomial Test 
WL 65% 35% 64% 36% 0.00 
WS 63% 37% 65% 35% 0.00 
BL 64% 36% 65% 35% 0.00 
BS 65% 35% 63% 37% 0.00 
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Figure 5.3.2: The Percentage of Order Adjustments toward Prior Demand 
 
Overall, we can observe the effect of demand chasing heuristic in aggregate terms, and 
for most of the retailers at the subject level.  
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Figure 5.3.3: In Wholesale Price Experiments Cumulative Distribution of Percentage of 
Orders toward Prior Demand 
 
 
Figure 5.3.4: In Buyback Experiments Cumulative Distribution of Percentage of Orders 
toward Prior Demand 
 
From Figure 5.3.3 and Figure 5.3.4 we observe that the percentage of orders toward 
prior demand is higher in short run experiments than in long run experiments. The 
comparison in the buyback experiments is, though, not that clear.  
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5.3.2 Adjustment Scores 
The first metric that we considered in Section 5.3.1 only counted the number of 
changes. To capture the “strength” of adjustments, we define the adjustment score as 
(qpt - qpt-1) / (dt-1 - qt-1). This metric is a modified version of the one used in Schweitzer 
and Cachon (2000). These scores are computed separately for moves toward and away 
from the previous period’s demand. A significant difference (as measured by the Mann-
Whitney test) between adjustment scores towards and away was taken as an indicator of 
demand chasing. We ignore the data of periods in which   qt =0 or dt-1= qt-1 or qpt-1= qpt. 
 
Table 5.3.2 presents the aggregate results for each experiment type. We compare the 
median values, because taking average can be misleading due to the wide interval of 
adjustment scores. We observe only in wholesale price long run experiments (WL) 
significantly higher toward scores. According to the theory especially in short run 
experiments, the retailers consider the side effects while they are in decision making 
situation, such as; previous demand, mean demand, and previous profits. Therefore, we 
expect significantly higher toward scores in short run experiments. We especially 
expect in wholesale price short run experiments, due to the more complicated structure 
of buyback experiments. 
 
Table 5.3.2: Mean and Median Values of Adjustment Scores of Experiments 
 
The Mean Value The Median Value 
Experiment Type  Toward Away  Toward Away 
WL 0.0122 0.0128 0.0042
*3
 0.0035 
WS  0.0099 0.0130 0.0035 0.0039 
BL  0.0103 0.0095 0.0033 0.0033 
BS  0.0097 0.0159 0.0036 0.0034 
                                                          
3
 *is implements the significance of WL experiments in 0.05 level. 
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5.3.3 Regression 
 
Bostian et.al (2008) uses the following regression equation to measure the extent of 
demand chasing.  
         (              )     
(7)                                                                                               
where ε is an iid normal error term. Here, the parameter β reflects the “extent of demand 
chasing”. It measures how far the subject moves toward the most recent demand 
observation relative to their last choice. To be consistent with demand chasing, β must 
lie in the interval (0, 1] with β=1 implying full demand chasing.  We adopt this method 
by replacing the q values with the qp values we defined earlier as follows: 
           (              )     
(8) 
For each individual subject and for pooled data we regress (qpt - qpt-1) on (dt-1 - qt-1) and 
record the β values. Figure 5.3.5 shows the cumulative distribution of β-coefficients 
obtained from individual regressions. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.5: Cumulative Distribution of β-coefficient 
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In all experiment types, for every subject β-coefficients are almost positive. However 
the results say that 61% of subjects in WL, 59% in WS, 57% in BL, and 56% in BS 
have positive β-coefficients that are significant at the 0.10 level.  
The aggregate data of each experiment type has positive β-coefficients and are 
significant at the 0.10 level. Table 5.3.3 indicates the aggregate β-coefficients. The 
regression equations are significant for all experiments; however adjusted R
2
 values are 
very low. Hence, although the regression equations are significant and meaningful, the 
variation in the order quantities cannot be explained by the chosen independent 
variables. This is mostly due to the heterogeneity in subjects. As a conclusion, we 
cannot observe the demand chasing by doing regression analyses at aggregate level in 
our experiments.  
Table 5.3.3: The Aggregate β-coefficients 
Experiment 
Type 
β-coefficient p-value  Adj. R2 
Number of Data 
Points 
Proportion of 
Retailers with 
Significant 
Regression 
Equation 
WL 0.0022 0.00 11.59 604 0.00 
WS 0.0019 0.00 9.66 607 0.00 
BL 0.0022 0.00 13.59 375 0.07 
BS 0.0020 0.00 8.60 439 0.00 
 
5.3.4 Correlation 
An alternative way to measure demand chasing in standard newsvendor experiments is 
to calculate the correlation between qt and dt-1 series for every subject (Bolton and 
Katok 2008, Lau et al. 2012). A positive correlation between these two variables would 
support demand chasing. We adopt this approach to our setting by replacing qt with qpt. 
 
We find that 57% of subjects in WL, 68% in WS, 50% in BL, and 56% in BS have 
positive correlation between qpt and dt-1. Figure 5.3.6 shows the cumulative distribution 
of correlation values obtained from individual correlations. The results say that the most 
of the correlation values are around 0.30 in each experiment type. 
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Hence, according to the first method (counting changes towards vs. away from prior 
demand), demand chasing can be observed both at subject and aggregate level. 
According to the third (regression) and fourth method (correlation), demand chasing can 
be observed only at subject level but not at aggregate level. However, according to the 
second method (adjustment score), demand chasing cannot be observed both at subject 
and aggregate levels except at wholesale price long run experiments. 
 
 
Figure 5.3.6: Cumulative Distribution of Correlation Values  
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CHAPTER 6  
 
6 DETERMINING THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT ORDER 
DECISIONS 
 
Until now, we have observed that the retailers deviate from the optimal newsvendor 
order quantity decision. In this chapter, we try to figure out what factors affect these 
decisions of the retailers. We use the data of buyback contract short-run experiments to 
avoid fairness effect that might be present in the long-run experiments. This data 
consists of 16 retailer and 16 manufacturer’s 30 period decisions where different 
manufacturer-retailer pairs are matched in each period. We analyze each retailer’s 
decision individually, since using the average does not seem to be appropriate.  
First, to identify the most important factors, we apply “feature selection” methodology 
to data. Then, we build regression models to capture the relationship between the order 
quantity decisions and the selected attributes. 
 
6.1  Selection of the Factors 
Feature selection is the process of selecting a subset of relevant features to use in model 
construction. Feature selection has been an active research area in statistics and data 
mining. The central assumption when using a feature selection technique is that the data 
contains many redundant or irrelevant features. The objective of feature selection is 
three-fold: Improving the prediction performance of the predictors, providing faster and 
more cost-effective predictors, and providing a better understanding of the underlying 
process that generated the data (Guyon and Elisseeff 2003). 
 
We apply Feature Selection to each individual retailer decision maker’s order quantity 
decisions, and try to figure out which attributes are effective in each individual’s 
decision making process. To this end, we use the machine learning software Weka, 
which contains a collection of visualization tools and algorithms for data analysis and 
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predictive modeling, together with graphical user interfaces for easy access to this 
functionality.  
We chose the order quantity as the “output” because of investigating the effects of other 
attributes on the order quantity decision. Additionally we chose nine “attributes” that 
can potentially affect the order quantity decision as as shown in Table 6.1.1. These 
attributes were chosen based on literature including: Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), 
Bolton et al. (2008), Bolton and Katok (2008), Bostian et al. (2008), and Becker-Peth et 
al. (2013). 
Table 6.1.1: Output Variable and Attributes 
Output Current Period’s 
Attributes 
Abbreviation 
Previous Period’s 
Attributes 
Abbreviation 
O
rd
er
 q
u
an
ti
ty
 
Period period 
Past Demand 
Realization 
pdr 
Cost of Underage cu 
Retailer Realized 
Profit 
rr 
Cost Of Overage co 
Manufacturer Realized 
Profit 
mr 
Manufacturer 
Predicted Profit 
mp 
Retailer’s Profit 
Share 
profitshare 
Retailer Predicted 
Profit 
rp 
  
 
 
As seen in the table, we used predictor variables that are relevant to both the previous 
period, and also to the current period.  
 
Current period variables: Period refers to the phases of 30 period decisions. We 
assign number “1” for the first ten periods’ decision, “2” for the next ten periods’ 
decision, and “3” for the last ten periods.  Cost of underage is the cost that retailer loses 
if he orders less than demand. Cost of overage is the cost that retailer has to pay if he 
orders more than demand. These variables are used instead of the contract parameters 
wholesale price and buyback price, such that the data from different contract types can 
be compared in future studies. Manufacturer predicted profit and retailer predicted 
profit are the expected profits of the players in the current period when the retailer sets 
the newsvendor optimal order quantity.  
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Previous period variables: Past demand realization, manufacturer realized profit, 
retailer realized profit, and retailer’s profit share refers to the relevant values in the 
previous period.  
 
For feature selection, the RelieffAttributeEval function of WEKA software was used 
with the ranker search method. RelieffAttributeEval method evaluates the value of an 
attribute by repeatedly sampling an instance and considering the value of the given 
attribute for the nearest instance of the same and different class. This method operates 
on both discrete and continuous class data. In ranker method, all attributes are ranked 
starting from the most important one to the least important one. Cross validation is 
selected as the Attribute Selection Method. 
 
We applied the same method to all 16 retailer’s decisions and we recorded each 
retailer’s five most important features. We assign weights to the attributes such as “5” if 
the attribute is the most important one and “1” if it is the last one important. Then, we 
calculated each attribute’s weighted sum, and we rank the first five attributes that are 
most effective in making decisions. The results are shown in Table 6.1.2 and Table 
6.1.3. 
Table 6.1.2: The Most Important 5 Attributes Selected by Retailers 
  Retailer Selected Att.1 Selected Att.2 Selected Att.3 Selected Att.4 Selected Att.5 
1 pdr co mr p rr 
2 co rp mp cu pdr 
3 co rp cu pdr mp 
4 mr pdr rr cu profitshare 
5 co profitshare mp rp cu 
6 mr co pdr profitshare p 
7 co rp pdr mp mr 
8 co rp mp cu rr 
9 co mp rr cu p 
10 cu co rp mp mr 
11 co mp pdr rp p 
12 co rp cu mp mr 
13 pdr co mp profitshare mr 
14 rp mr cu co p 
15 co mp rp cu profitshare 
16 co mp rp cu pdr 
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Weighted sum of each selected attribute are shown in Table 6.1.3.We observe that cost 
of overage is the most important attribute that affects the retailer decisions. The other 
important attributes include retailer’s predicted profit, manufacturer’s predicted profit, 
past demand realization and cost of underage. 
Table 6.1.3: Weighted Sum of Each Attribute in Experiments 
Attribute Weighted Sum 
co 68 
rp 38 
mp 35 
pdr 27 
cu 27 
mr 21 
profitshare 10 
rr 8 
p 6 
 
The reason why cost of overage is the most important attribute might be related to risk 
aversion of the retailer. The buyback price is generally far less than the wholesale price 
in proposed contracts. Because demand is probabilistic, retailers avoid taking high risk 
and hence, cost of overage becomes the most important factor affecting their order 
quantity decision. Predicted profits of both sides might be important due to the fairness 
concerns. If manufacturer’s predicted profit is much higher in a given contract, retailer 
will not be willing to order high quantities.  
 
6.2 Regression Analysis  
The next step after feature selection is classification. Classification takes a data set with 
known output values and uses this data set to build a model. We apply linear regression 
method to classify the data in Minitab software. The output is retailer’s order quantity 
decision, and the selected five attributes are the independent variables of the regression 
model. We hope to build more accurate regression models as we exclude the redundant 
attributes identified in the feature selection phase.  
Recall that the selected five attributes are cost of overage, retailer’s predicted profit, 
manufacturer’s predicted profit, past demand realization and cost of underage. We 
expect order quantity to be increasing in the retailer’s predicted profit, and past demand 
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realization and cost of underage; and decreasing in the cost of overage, and 
manufacturer’s predicted profit attributes. Minitab results for each individual retailer are 
shown below in Table 6.2.1. 
Table 6.2.1: Individual Regression Equations 
 
Retailer 
 
R2 
 
Adjusted 
R2 
 
p value 
 
Regression Equation 
1 
 
37.7% 
 
 
24.1% 
 
0.042 Q = 569 + 0,317 pdr - 0,017 mp - 0,085 rp + 7,93 cu-3,01 co 
2 
 
85.2% 
 
 
81.9% 
 
0.000 Q = -208 - 0,036 pdr + 0,018 mp + 0,044 rp - 3,10 cu + 0,55 co 
3 
 
83.8% 
 
 
80.3% 
 
0.000 Q = -943 + 0,068 pdr + 0,050 mp + 0,095 rp - 6,39 cu + 2,54 co 
4 
 
41.4% 
 
 
27.4% 
 
0.035 
 
Q= -526 + 0,248 pdr + 0,030 mp - 0,002 rp + 2,68 cu + 0,23 co 
 
5 
 
95.0% 
 
 
93.9% 
 
 
0.008 
 
 
Q= -362 - 0,010 pdr + 0,0251 mp + 0,057 rp - 4,03 cu + 1,00 co 
 
6 
 
18.4% 
 
 
0.64% 
 
0.420 Q= 1073 + 0,213 pdr - 0,044 mp - 0,095 rp + 6,86 cu - 3,04 co 
7 
 
57.0% 
 
 
46.7% 
 
0.002 
 
Q = -1253 + 0,193 pdr + 0,066 mp + 0,122 rp - 8,03 cu + 2,84 co 
 
8 
 
70.0% 
 
 
63.5% 
 
0.000 
 
Q = 381 + 0,041 pdr - 0,008 mp + 0,014 rp - 2,70 cu - 0,11 co 
 
9 
 
48.4% 
 
 
36.1% 
 
0.011 Q = 225 - 0,053 pdr - 0,0014 mp + 0,0001 rp + 0,29 cu - 0,829 co 
10 
 
69.4% 
 
 
62.7% 
 
0.000 
 
Q = -347 + 0,027 pdr + 0,025 mp + 0,036 rp - 1,61 cu + 0,535 co 
 
11 
 
49.2% 
 
 
35.1% 
 
0.022 
 
Q = 158 - 0,019 pdr - 0,0024 mp + 0,035 rp - 2,51 cu - 0,35 co 
 
12 
 
61.6% 
 
 
52.5% 
 
0.001 
 
Q = -895 - 0,188 pdr + 0,050 mp + 0,118 rp - 8,73 cu + 2,98 co 
 
13 
 
25.2% 
 
 
8.9% 
 
0.214 
 
Q = -648 - 0,060 pdr + 0,0383 mp + 0,059 rp - 3,84 cu + 1,77 co 
 
14 
 
58.0% 
 
 
31.7% 
 
0.153 Q = -1300 + 0,259 pdr + 0,064 mp + 0,087 rp -3,94 cu + 2,54 co 
     15 
 
81.7% 
 
 
77.7% 
 
0.000 
 
Q = 264 - 0,064 pdr - 0,0045 mp+ 0,0216 rp - 2,25 cu - 0,418 co 
 
16 
 
57.0% 
 
 
47.7% 
 
0.001 
 
Q = 136 + 0,185 pdr - 0,0036 mp + 0,0511 rp - 5,04 cu + 0,50 co 
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The regression equations are almost significant and R-squared values seem high 
enough. However, most of the factors in regression equations were not found to be 
significant even at 10% level. Significant factors in equations are shown with bold 
fonts. 
 
The signs of the beta coefficients in regression equations usually do not follow our 
predictions. For example, cost of overage usually has a positive sign, whereas cost of 
underage has negative. We expect the order quantity to be increasing in the retailer’s 
predicted profit, and decreasing in the manufacturer’s predicted profit. Interestingly, the 
manufacturer’s predicted profit sign is negative for most retailers but the retailer’s 
predicted profit sign is positive for all retailers as expected. The retailers seem to care 
positively about the manufacturer’s profit as well.  
 
Next, we develop regression models on “pooled” data for each experiment. We consider 
each retailer as an independent variable not to lose the individual effect of each subject. 
Results are shown in Table 6.2.2. 
 
Table 6.2.2: Regression Equation of Pooled Data 
R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 p value Regression Equation  
 
40.1% 
 
 
37.2% 
 
0.000 
 
Q_16 = 170,1+0,0532 pdr - 0,00083 mp - 0,00135 rp+0,459 cu - 
0,609 co – 0,11 r2 + - 10,63 r3  + 10,71 r4 + 1,03 r5 - 19,73 r6 -
 14,34 r7 + 5,73 r8+9,97 r9+17,74 r10 - 9,64 r11+12,57 r12 -
 15,49 r13  - 0,3 r14 -13,05 r15 -  22,71 r16 
  
 
The regressions itself, as well as the attributes past demand realization and cost of 
overage are found to be significant. Their signs are also consistent with our predictions. 
However, while the manufacturer’s predicted profit has negative sign, the retailer’s 
predicted profit has also negative sign which is contrary to our predictions. Among the 
16 retailers, only four of them are found to be significant (r6, r10, r13, and r16). 
 
Based on these observations, we conclude that although it is reasonable to apply 
regression, we could not find strong evidence between the attributes and the order 
quantity decision.  
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CHAPTER 7  
 
7 LEARNING BY DOING 
Whether and how learning occurs in the newsvendor problem has been a popular 
question among experimental OM researchers. We would like to answer the question: 
“Do retailer subjects in our experiments learn to make better decisions over time?”  
 
We will first consider the data from our main experiments. We then present another 
study that considers the effect of gender difference in learning. For that study, we use 
the data from another experiment, which involves only the standard newsvendor 
decision (i.e., no manufacturers).  
 
7.1  Is Learning Effect Observed in the Main Experiments? 
Recall that in our experiments every period the optimal order quantity changes. In order 
to measure whether the subjects learn to make better decisions over time, we consider 
the absolute difference between the order quantity decisions and the optimal order 
quantity. If learning exists, this difference should decrease over time.  In particular, we 
hypothesize that for a given retailer subject, the average difference in the last 10 periods 
should be smaller than the average difference in the first 10 periods.  
 
We ignore the data where q=0. Table 7.1.1 shows the individual results for all 
experiment types. The colored cells indicate the retailers whose average absolute 
difference between the order quantity decisions and the optimal order quantity 
decreased from first 10 periods to last 10 periods. Overall, we observe 45% of the 
retailers to exhibit decreasing difference behavior, hence an indication of learning. 
However, not all decreases are statistically significant. As Table 7.1.2 indicates, less 
than 50% of the retailers have significant decrease results in each experiment type (the 
statistical significance is measured by the Mann-Whitney test at 0.10 level). 
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Table 7.1.1: The Individual Results for All Experiment Types 
Individual 
Subjects 
(Retailers) 
WL 
Average |q-q*| 
WS  
Average |q-q*| 
BL  
Average |q-q*| 
BS  
Average |q-q*| 
First 10 
period 
Last 10 
period 
First 10 
period 
Last 10 
period 
First 10 
period 
Last 10 
period 
First 10 
period 
Last 10 
period 
r1 18 21 16 21 20 34 45 22 
r2 21 19 13 9 23 22 12 7 
r3 45 26 18 6 7 10 11 12 
r4 36 25 40 14 44 10 20 45 
r5 29 21 28 10 26 27 0 0 
r6 18 13 35 47 28 37 51 57 
r7 17 35 39 26 40 25 33 38 
r8 42 43 43 20 23 48 14 18 
r9 14 11 35 24 39 80 47 18 
r10 12 22 30 69 35 67 23 20 
r11 76 47 22 5 24 17 9 48 
r12 10 13 26 27 20 10 24 45 
r13 25 67 13 34 7 60 32 23 
r14 42 64 54 32 33 24 37 26 
r15 17 18 31 20     18 4 
r16 17 25 22 36     27 26 
r17 8 15 14 38         
r18 64 55 5 12         
r19 18 36 13 36         
r20 11 30 18 48         
r21 16 69 29 30         
r22 7 21 18 9         
r23 67 52             
 
 
Table 7.1.2: The Proportion of Retailers with Significant Result 
Experiment Type Proportion of Significant Retailers 
WL 35% 
WS 41% 
BL 29% 
BS 38% 
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7.2 The Effect of Learning in terms of Gender 
In this study, we aim to understand whether a learning effect exists and differs from 
gender to gender in the standard newsvendor experiments. In order to evaluate this topic 
we used the data which is gathered in a former study by Nukte Sahin, a former graduate 
student of Dr. Kaya.  
 
The experiment was conducted with 156 students (82 male and 74 female) of the course 
MS 401 in the spring semester 2010/2011. These students had already studied the basic 
newsvendor problem. To provide incentive, the subjects’ total profit at the end of the 
experimental session was converted into a bonus applied to the course final grade. The 
bonus ranged between 1% and 2.5%. Experiments were conducted in the CAFE (Center 
for Applied Finance Education) computer laboratory of Sabanci University. 
 
The subjects faced the standard newsvendor problem. They need to determine how 
much to order from the manufacturer before the sales season. They know that the 
demand (D) will be uniformly distributed between 50 and 150. The purchase price of 
the product is w=$35, and the sales price in the market is p=$90. The objective of the 
subjects is to maximize their total profit over the 40 periods.  
 
To investigate the impact of learning in the newsvendor setting, we regressed the data 
using the following equation. 
 
                               
(9) 
The dependent variable is the absolute difference between the optimal order quantity 
and the order quantity decision. The independent variables are gender (a binary 
variable), and period. The analysis is carried out in the Minitab software. Comparisons 
are assessed by the Mann-Whitney test at 0.05 significance level. 
 
We use two different approaches to test for learning.  The first approach is based on 
measuring experience with respect to period, similar to Bolton and Katok (2008). We 
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run the regression for each subject separately, and record the regression coefficient on 
period (β2).  
Hypothesis: The median period coefficient of males (µm) is not different from the 
coefficients of females (µf). That is, there is no difference between males and females in 
learning. 
 
We find the male median coefficient to be lower than the female coefficient 
(µm=0.05755, µf=0.09010). However, the difference is not significant. Hence, we 
cannot reject the hypotheses: there is no significant difference between males and 
females in learning (p=0.5486).  
 
In the second approach, we compared the order quantities in the first half of the periods 
with the second half. This is similar to Benzion et al. (2008). 
 
Hypothesis: The median period coefficient (µl) in the last half of the periods is larger 
than the median periods’ coefficient (µb) in the first half of the periods. This holds true 
for both male and female subjects separately.  
 
According to the test results, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected both for males 
(µfb=-0.0026, µfl=-0.0147, p=0.4755) and females (µmb=0.0000 µml= 0.0212, 
p=0.2470). That is, the order quantities of both male and female subjects are not closer 
to the optimal level in the last 20 periods than in the first 20 periods. We cannot find 
evidence for learning both for male and female subjects. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this research, we consider decision-making experiments that are conducted with 
human decision makers on a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where the retailer faces 
a newsvendor problem. In standard newsvendor experiments, in all periods the retailer 
faces the same contract offered by the computer. However, in our experimental setting 
the optimal order quantity for the retailer’s problem changes every period based on the 
offered contract. This strategic interaction, as well as the other documented biases in 
newsvendor decisions affects the retailer subjects’ order quantity choice.  Our goal is to 
explain the decision making mechanism of the retailer subjects in this setting. To this 
end, we conducted three studies.   
 
In our first study, we aim to answer whether the subjects exhibit the pull to center 
effect, and whether they follow certain decision heuristics while making their order 
decisions. We observe that most subjects do not exhibit a strong pull to center behavior. 
One reason is that the optimal order quantities are rather close to the mean demand 
value, which causes the pull to center region to shrink. We could find weak support for 
the mean anchoring heuristic at aggregate level, but not at individual level. For the 
demand chasing heuristic, aggregate level support is high; however, we could find 
strong support at individual level. When studying the demand chasing heuristic, in 
addition to the standard metrics used in literature, we defined our own metric. This 
metric considers the fact that the optimal order quantity is changing from one period to 
the other, based on the offered contract.  
 
An important observation we have is that subject-level data is highly heterogeneous.  
Hence, it would be misleading to accept the existence of these heuristics for a given 
individual just because they are known to exist at aggregate level. Thus, one needs to be 
careful in using the aggregate (or, average) results in literature because they do not 
necessarily apply to a given individual.  
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In our second study, we apply “feature selection” and “classification” techniques to 
understand the factors that affect the order quantity decisions of retailer subjects. We 
came up with nine candidate attributes that are related to either the current or the 
previous period data. Among these, we determine the most important five factors as cost 
of overage, manufacturer’s predicted profit, retailer’s predicted profit, cost of underage 
and past demand realization. We then build regression models separately for each 
individual. The regression equations are significant, R-squared values are high, and the 
beta coefficients have almost predicted signs. However, most of the attributes are not 
found to be significant for most individuals. Here again, heterogeneity plays an 
important role. One cannot come up with a set of, say, five attributes that turn out to be 
significant for all individuals.  
 
In our third study, we aim to understand if and how the subjects’ decisions change over 
time due to learning-by-doing. To test whether they learn to make better decisions over 
time, we consider the average absolute difference between the stock quantity decisions 
and the optimal order quantity. If learning exists, this difference should decrease over 
time. We observe less than 50% of the retailers to have a significant decrease in each 
experiment type. 
 
We also conducted a side study to test whether subject gender affects learning. For this 
study, we used data from a simple newsvendor experiment (i.e., no manufacturer 
subjects). We built a regression model where the absolute difference between the stock 
quantity decisions and the optimal order quantity is the dependent variable, and the 
gender (a binary variable) and period are the independent variables. We could not 
observe a significant learning effect, and also any significant difference in learning 
between genders. The absolute difference between the subjects’ stock quantity decisions 
and the optimal order quantity is not decreasing over time.  
 
This work can be extended in numerous ways. One extension is to study the 
manufacturer’s contract choice behavior. Another is to conduct experiments on other 
supply chain contract types, such as revenue sharing, quantity discount contract and 
rebate contract, and present a more complete comparison in terms of the factors that 
affect the retailer’s stock quantity decisions. Yet another possibility is applying feature 
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selection techniques with a larger set of potential factors. We have only tested whether 
learning exists. One can also develop a model of learning, such as the Experience 
Weighted Attraction (EWA) learning model. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix  A Main Script Code in Buyback Experiments 
 
// Define Player List 
 Players p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7,p8,p9,p10,p11,p12,p13,p14,p15,p16; 
 Integer nplayer = 16;   //number of players 
// Declare variables 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-model.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-dummy.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\var-state.cfg"); 
// Set parameter value 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\dat-parameter.dat"); 
// Define inputs 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\def-input.cfg"); 
//Stage logon  
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-logon.cfg"); 
// Game stages 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-start.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-setgrid.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-predisplay.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-fetchdata.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-exchange.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-results.cfg"); 
 Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-periodend.cfg"); 
Stage writedb {                                 // no db write statements in debug 
  Script("c:\program files\hp mums\Scripts\buyback\stage-dblog-
period.cfg"); 
  if (stage=1) 
  { End;} 
  else 
  {Goto start;} 
}  
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Appendix  B The Script of dat-parameter.dat in Buyback Contract 
Experiments 
stage setparameter  
{ 
 if (period=1 & stage=1) 
 {  // parameters start here 
  wholesalegiven = 0; 
  buybackgiven = 0; 
   
  price = 250;  
  unitcost = 50; 
  wholesale = 0; 
  buyback = 0; 
  mindemand = 40; 
  maxdemand = 230;              //parameters end here 
 
  // manufacturer's stage description 
  stagedesc[0,1] = "Wholesale and buyback price selection"; 
  stagedesc[0,2] = "Waiting for the retailer"; 
  stagedesc[0,3] = "Period results"; 
 
  // retailer's stage description 
  stagedesc[1,1] = "Waiting for manufacturer";  
  stagedesc[1,2] = "Stock quantity decision"; 
  stagedesc[1,3] = "Period results"; 
   
  numman = int(nplayer/2); 
  numret = nplayer - numman; 
 } 
  
 //allocation of fixed roles and variable partners   
 if (stage=1) 
 {    
 matched=0; 
 pos1=0; 
 pos2=0; 
              for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   allocation1[i] = -1; 
  } 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   allocation2[i] = -1; 
  } 
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   pos1 = int(nplayer/2*random); 
   if (pos1 = nplayer/2) 
   { 
    pos1 = nplayer/2-1; 
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   } 
    
   
   if (allocation1[pos1] = -1) 
   { 
    allocation1[pos1] = i; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    while (allocation1[pos1] <> -1) 
    { 
     pos1 = (pos1 + 1) % (nplayer/2); 
    } 
    allocation1[pos1] = i; 
   } 
  } 
   
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
   pos2 = int(nplayer/2*random); 
   if (pos2 = nplayer/2) 
   { 
    pos2 = nplayer/2-1; 
   } 
    
   if (allocation2[pos2] = -1) 
   { 
    allocation2[pos2] = i+nplayer/2; 
   } 
   else 
   { 
    while (allocation2[pos2] <> -1) 
    { 
     pos2 = (pos2 + 1) % (nplayer/2); 
    } 
    allocation2[pos2] = i+nplayer/2; 
   } 
  } 
 
   
  for (i=0; i<nplayer/2; i=i+1) 
  { 
      
 match[allocation1[i]]=allocation2[i]; 
 match[allocation2[i]]=allocation1[i]; 
    
 role[allocation1[i]] = 0;  //manufacturer 
 role[allocation2[i]] = 1;  //retailer 
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 demand[allocation1[i]] = mindemand + int((maxdemand - 
mindemand)*random); 
 demand[allocation2[i]] = 0; 
  } 
   
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) 
  { 
   for (i=0; i<nplayer; i=i+1) 
   { 
    if (role[i] = 0) 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = wholesale; 
     buybackset[i] = buyback; 
    } 
    else 
    { 
     wholesaleset[i] = -1; 
     buybackset[i] = -1; 
    } 
   } 
  }  
 
  if (wholesalegiven = 1  &  buybackgiven = 1) 
  { 
   stage = 2;     // advance to stage 2 right away 
  } 
 } 
} 
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Appendix  C Instructions for Buyback Contract Experiments with Variable 
Partners 
 
Instructions for Buyback Contract Experiments 
March 23
th
, 2011 
Random Match 
 
Scenario 
 
We consider two independent firms: a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer produces a 
certain product. The retailer buys the product from the manufacturer by paying a wholesale 
price w per unit, and sells it to consumers at a retail price p=250. Consumer demand is 
distributed uniformly between 40 and 230. That is, demand is equally likely to be an integer 
value between 40 and 230. After the demand is realized, the manufacturer buys back the 
products that the retailer cannot sell by paying the retailer buyback price b per unit. 
 
       
       p      
 
The game has three stages: 
 
Stage-1:   The manufacturer determines the wholesale price, w and the buyback price, b. The 
wholesale price cannot be larger than the retail price p=250. The buyback price cannot be larger 
than the wholesale price. 
 
Stage-2:   Given the wholesale price and buyback price decisions of the manufacturer, the 
retailer determines his order quantity, q. The retailer orders this quantity of products from the 
manufacturer. The manufacturer produces the products by incurring a unit production cost 
c=50, and sends them to the retailer. The retailer stocks these products prior to the selling 
season. The retailer’s stock quantity can be either zero or lie between 40 and 230, the maximum 
consumer demand value.   
 
Stage-3:  Random consumer demand is realized as “d”. The retailer’s sales quantity is the 
minimum of his stock quantity and the realized demand:         .  Depending on whether the 
demand is greater or less than retailer’s stock quantity, two cases are possible: 
 
Consumer Demand 
~UNIFORM(40,230) 
 
  Retailer Manufacturer 
w 
q 
p=250 
c=50 
b 
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 If d>q, then (d-q) units of demand will be unsatisfied  (Unsatisfied demand) 
 If d<q, then (q-d) products will be unsold at the retailer (leftover products). The 
manufacturer will buy back these units from the retailer.  
 
The retailer’s payoff is calculated as                                               . 
The manufacturer’s payoff is calculated as     (   )                              
Note that there are three decisions in the game: The manufacturer determines w and b, and then 
the retailer determines q.  
 
Experiment Preparation 
 
 The experiments will take place at the CAFÉ (Center for Applied Finance Education) 
computer lab at the G-floor of the FMAN building. 
 Please come to the experiments on-time so that we can start and finish on time.  
 You will play a pilot experiment to solidify your understanding of the software. 
 Please do not open any other program, including other browser windows, during the 
experiments. 
 Please enter “integer values” for all decisions, and pay attention to the data entry rules. 
 
The Experiment 
 
 In the experiments, you will play the role of either a manufacturer or a retailer for a number 
of “periods”. Your role will be fixed in all periods of an experiment. In each period, the 
server will randomly match each manufacturer with a retailer. That is, you will be (most 
likely) playing with different opponents at each period. You will not know with whom you 
are matched.  
 The periods are independent of each other. For example, inventory is not carried from one 
period to the next. Only your payoff will accumulate over periods.  
 
A Sample Screenshot 
 
Figure 1 illustrates how the retailer’s screen will look like at stage 2.  
 The large table in the middle of the screen is your “decision support tool” (to be 
explained). 
 The yellow box on the upper left presents general information including the period number, 
your current role, the wholesale price, and the buyback price that were set at stage 1. The 
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box also presents two game parameters that are given and fixed throughout all periods (unit 
production cost, and retail price). 
 The blue box in the upper right presents information on the last period.  
 The pink box in the bottom is where you “submit” your decision to the server. You enter 
your decision value into the related gray box, hit “enter” and then click on the green 
“Submit” button at the bottom (that will be visible during experiment). The submit button is 
activated only after you enter a valid decision and hit enter (or, click somewhere in the 
screen).  Invalid entries will cause warnings. 
 Note that the cells in which you can enter values are the ones with “gray” background. 
 You can check the results of previous periods by clicking the “Historical Results” tab in the 
bottom. This will open a second worksheet with the titles seen below: 
 
 
Figure 0.1: Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 
 
 
Figure 0.2: Historical Results Screenshot  
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The Decision Support Tool 
 
Before you submit a decision, you can use the "what-if" decision-support tool provided to you. 
This tool allows you to calculate the outcome for certain values of your decision, your 
opponent’s decision, and for specific realizations of the consumer demand. Note that the values 
you enter in this area are only for your temporary calculations. The only value that goes to the 
server (i.e., that is recorded) is the one you submit in the “stock quantity” box that you will find 
at the bottom of the screen.  
 
The retailer’s decision support tool can be seen in Figure 1. You may enter a “stock quantity” 
value in the top gray cell. To help you visualize the possible outcomes if you really set this 
stock quantity, the table in the decision support tool summarizes the outcome for different 
consumer demand realizations (d=40, 70, …, 230), each in a row.  
 
In the example above, the retailer’s stock quantity is entered as 200. We observe from the table 
that if consumer demand turns out to be, for example, 130, you (retailer) will sell 130 units 
because the demand is smaller than the stock quantity. You leftover inventory will be 200-
130=70 units. The manufacturer will buy back these units. Since you satisfied all consumer 
demand, there will be no unsatisfied consumer demand.  
 
Compare this with the outcome if consumer demand turns out to be 220. In this case, you (the 
retailer) will sell all of your 200 units, and there will be zero leftover inventory. Unsatisfied 
demand will be 220-200=20 units. As you sell your entire stock quantity, the manufacturer will 
not buy back any inventory. The last two columns provide your payoff and the manufacturer’s 
payoff. 
 
At stage 1, the manufacturer’s decision support tool will look like below: 
 
67 
 
 
Figure 0.3: Manufacturer’s Decision Support Tool at Stage 1 
 
At this stage, you (the manufacturer) will submit your wholesale price and buyback price. 
However, in order to use the decision support tool, you also need to guess what stock quantity 
the retailer might determine at stage 2.  
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Appendix  D Manufacturer’s Screen at Stage 1 
 
 
Figure 4: Manufacturer’s Screen at Stage 1 Screenshot 
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Appendix  E Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 
 
 
Figure 5: Retailer’s Screen at Stage 2 Screenshot 
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Appendix  F Results Screen    
 
Visible to Manufacturer 
 
Figure 6: Manufacturer’s Historical Result Sheet Screenshot 
Visible to Retailer 
 
Figure 7: Retailer’s Historical Result Sheet Screenshot 
 
 
 
 
 
